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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Dupree Lamar Meadows appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of burglary, felony concealment of evidence,
and obstructing a police officer, and the trial court finding that he is a persistent
violator of the law.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Dallas Fredrickson and his girlfriend, Josephine Ziady, hosted a party at
their Coeur d'Alene home. (Tr., 1 p.48, L.2 - p.51. L.12; p.92, Ls.2-7.) Ziady and
Chase Pappell, a party attendee, went outside to smoke.

(Tr., p.54, Ls.8-13.)

From the front of the house, they saw Dupree Meadows, who had left the party
approximately fifteen to twenty minutes earlier, standing near Fredrickson's truck.
(Tr., p.54, L.2 - p.56, L.11.) They saw papers on the ground near the truck, and
Meadows reaching down to pick them up. (Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.57, L.5.)
Finding Meadows' actions suspicious, Ziady returned to the party and told
Fredrickson what she saw. (Tr., p.57, L.24 - p.58, L.9.) Fredrickson and Ziady
went to Fredrickson's vehicle and noticed that several items were missing,
including CDs, a CD player, the bulb of a gift-boxed flower, papers from
Fredrickson's glove box, a floor jack, a bandana, and a toolbox. (Tr., p.58, L.20 -

1

The appellate record contains two reporter's transcripts. In this brief, the
Respondent refers to the transcript that contains the motion to suppress hearing,
the jury trial and the sentencing hearing as "Tr.," and the transcript that contains
the voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments, as "Augmented Tr."
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p.59, L.23; p.79, L.25 - p.80, L.25; Tr., p.94, Ls.1-16.) Fredrickson and Ziady
went to Meadows' apartment complex and found Meadows' vehicle in the parking
lot there. (Tr., p.61, Ls.1-20; p.95, L.14 - p.96, L.6.) Looking into the vehicle,
Fredrickson and Ziady were able to see some of the items that were missing
from Fredrickson's truck.

(Tr., p.61, L.21 -

p.62, L.1 0; p.97, Ls.4-11.)

Fredrickson then contacted the Coeur d'Alene police. (Tr., p.98, Ls.1-11.)
After speaking with Fredrickson and looking at the items in Meadows'
vehicle, the responding officers knocked on Meadows' apartment door.

(Tr.,

p.98, L.12- p.99, L.12; p.150, L.12- p.152, L.7; p.165, Ls.9-13.) Meadows gave
the officers permission to enter, but asked them to stay in the entryway of the
apartment.

(Tr., p.170, L.10 - p.171, L.1.) The officers questioned Meadows,

but he denied involvement in the theft of items from Fredrickson's truck.

(Tr.,

p.192, Ls.16-24.)
Meadows was agitated and yelling. (Tr., p.171, L.5 - p.172, L.20; p.219,
Ls.2-24.)

Eventually, the officers told Meadows he was under arrest, but

Meadows refused to comply with orders to turn around and place his hands
behind his back, and instead sat down on his sofa. (Tr., p.172, Ls.13-18; p.220,
Ls.1-14.)

After threatening to use a taser, the officers were able to arrest

Meadows. (Tr., p.172, L.19 - p.173. L.2.) While in handcuffs, and prior to being
put in the patrol car, Meadows pulled away from one of the arresting officers and
tried to throw himself down on the ground. (Tr., p.173, Ls.7-20; p.220, L.25 p.221, L.14.)

2

After Meadows' arrest, Fredrickson and the officers found items belonging
to Fredrickson, including academic transcripts, bills, and a photo of his dog, in an
the apartment complex community dumpster. (Tr., p.102, Ls.13-20; p.105, L.25
- p.109, L.10; p.154, L.14 - p.158, L.25.)

Officers took photographs of

Fredrickson's property that was viewable inside Meadows' vehicle. (Tr., p.102,
L.21 - p.105, L.24.) The next day, the officers obtained a search warrant to
search Meadows' vehicle and recovered Fredrickson's property that was inside.
(R., Vol. I, pp.64-66; Tr., p.176, Ls.11-14; p.234, L.1-p.237, L.18.)
The state charged Meadows with burglary, felony concealment of
evidence, obstructing a police officer, and the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement. (R., Vol. II, pp.235-237.) Meadows filed a motion to suppress,
alleging that the responding officers lacked probable cause to arrest Meadows,
and that the officers did not comply with Meadows' revocation of consent to be in
the apartment. (R., Vol. I, pp.105-106; Vol. II, pp.177-187.) After a hearing, the
district court denied the motion, concluding that the officers had probable cause
to arrest Fredrickson for burglary, and that a reasonable person would not have
understood any of Meadows' comments to the officer as revoking consent to be
in his apartment. (R., Vol. II, pp.188-192.)
A jury found Meadows guilty of all charges. (R., Vol. II, pp.319-320.) After
Meadows waived his right to a jury trial for the persistent violator sentencing
enhancement, the district court found that the enhancement applied and that
Meadows was a persistent violator of the law. (Tr., p.273, L.11 - p.280, L.14.)

3

The district court entered concurrent sentences of two years fixed and 14 years
indeterminate on both the burgiary and felony concealment of evidence charges,
and a concurrent 180 days in jail on the obstructing an officer charge. (R., Vol. ii,
pp.332-337.) The district court ran all sentences concurrent with a separate Ada
County criminal sentence. (Id.) Meadows timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, pp.338341.)

4

ISSUES
Meadows states the issues on appeal as:
1.

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
BECAUSE
THE
POLICE
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT WHEN
THEY ENTERED FURTHER INTO THE APARTMENT TO
ARREST APPELLANT AND/OR THE CONSENT TO
POLICE ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE HAD BEEN
REVOKED

2.

WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE THAT
MR. MEADOWS HAD THE REQUISITE SPECIFIC INTENT
FOR THE CONCEALING EVIDENCE CHARGE, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, THE FACTS WHICH ENHANCED THE
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE TO A FELONY WERE NEVER
CHARGED AND WERE NOT FOUND BY THE JURY
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT IN VIOLATION OF
APPRENOI

3.

WHETHER THE OBSTRUCTING AN OFFICER JURY
INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED A FATAL VARIANCE
SINCE IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON A DIFFERENT
METHOD OF COMMITTING THE OFFENSE THAN HAD
BEEN CHARGED

(Appellant's brief, p.8 (capitalization in original).)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
1.

Has Meadows failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress?

2.

Has Meadows failed to show that the evidence supporting his
conviction for felony concealment of evidence was insufficient to prove
his guilt?

3.

Has Meadows failed to show that the district court utilized facts not found
by the jury to increase the statutory maximum penalty for the concealing
evidence charge in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey?

5

4.

Has Meadows failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to
relief based upon his unpreserved due process claim of a variance
between the jury instructions and the facts alleged in the charging
document?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
Meadows Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Meadows contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress evidence associated with his arrest.

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-14.)

Specifically, Meadows argues that the district court erred in concluding that he
did not effectively revoke the consent he gave the responding officers to enter his
apartment.

(Id.)

Meadows also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the

responding officers exceeded the scope of Meadows' consent by arresting him in
the living room. (Id.)
However, the record reveals that the district court properly concluded that
Meadows failed to show that he unequivocally revoked the consent.

Further,

Meadows has failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the officers
exceeded the scope of the consent. Finally, any error is harmless because even
if Meadows could show that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, no
evidence subject to his suppression motion was admitted at trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely

7

reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Meadows Did Not Revoke His
Consent
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal

and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693,
695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704,707,963 P.2d
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)).
Consent, freely and voluntarily given, may be revoked, thereby terminating
the authority of the police to continue the warrantless search. Staatz, 132 Idaho
at 696, 978 P.2d at 884 (citing State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 560, 716 P.2d
1328, 1332 (Ct. App. 1986)).

However, "[e]ffective withdrawal of consent

requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of either an act, statement, or some
combination of the two, that is inconsistent with the consent to the search
previously given." Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
This is because equivocal conduct can be construed in many different ways and,
therefore, does not pass muster under an objective reasonableness test.

&_;

accord United States v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1991 ); Nebraska v.
French, 279 N.W.2d 116, 119-120 (Neb. 1979); Lawrence v. Virginia, 435 S.E.2d
591, 595 (Va. 1993).
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The standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth
Amendment, including whether consent has been unequivocally revoked, is that
of objective reasonableness, i.e., "what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect." Staatz, 132
Idaho at 697, 978 P.2d at 884; Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991);
State v. Frizzel, 132 Idaho 522, 523, 975 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Ct. App. 1999). In
this case, applying the correct legal standards, the district court properly
concluded that Meadows had failed to show an effective revocation of consent.
Meadows acknowledges that he initially consented to the officer's entry
into his apartment. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) However, Meadows contends
that he revoked that consent prior to his arrest. (Id.) Meadows appears to assert
that the following exchange, which occurred during Meadows' cross-examination
of the responding officer at the motion to suppress hearing, evidenced his
revocation of consent:
Q:

Now, did Mr. Meadows or [Meadows' girlfriend] ever ask you
to leave or do anything like that?

A:

At one point Mr. Meadows became so agitated that he
started saying, "I didn't invite you into the house." He was
more concerned about calling 911, because we were there
trying to get the number for internal affairs, than paying
attention to what was going on or trying to listen to us
explain why were there.

(Tr., p.28, L.23 - p.29, L.6.)
In its written opinion and order denying Meadows' motion to suppress, the
district court concluded that Meadows' comments and demeanor, described by

9

the officer, did not constitute an unequivocal revocation of consent. The court
explained:
Defendant argues that he revoked his consent when he
allegedly "attempted to disengage from further warrantless actions
by police officers from the same agency." Defendant does not
explain the factual basis for this allegation. Perhaps defendant has
in mind his characterization of Officer Buhl's testimony [from the
motion to suppress hearing], where defendant states [in his brief in
support of the motion to suppress]: "Officer Buhl stated Meadows
become agitated to the point of requesting information for 'internal
affairs' and stating the officers 'were not invited inside the house."'
Since defendant admits, and the evidence is uncontradicted, that
he initially consented to the police presence in the entryway,
defendant's subsequent statement that officers were not invited
inside the house apparently meant that the officers were not invited
to enter further inside the house past the entryway. A typical
reasonable person would not have understood these statements to
be a revocation of consent.
(R., Vol. 11, p.190 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).)
Indeed, in light of the fact that Meadows did give the officer consent to the
enter the house, but expressly limited that consent to the entryway area, his
subsequent agitation, and comment that "I didn't invite you into the house,"
appear, from the perspective of a reasonable person, to be a reassertion of the
limited scope of the consent, rather than an unequivocal revocation of all
consent.

Certainly, this was equivocal language which could, at worst, be

construed in several different ways.
The district court correctly found that Meadows failed to show that he
unequivocally revoked the consent he gave the responding officers to enter the
apartment.

Meadows has thus failed to show that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress.
10

D.

Meadows Failed To Preserve His Claim That The Officers Exceeded The
Scope Of His Consent
The general rule in Idaho is that an appellate court will not consider an

alleged error on appeal in the absence of a timely objection at trial. State v.
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _ , 254 P.3d 77, 81 (Ct. App. 2011); State v.
Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 634, 977 P.2d 890, 896 (1999).

Further, 'T~or an

objection to be preserved for appellate review, the specific ground for the
objection must be clearly stated." State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d
494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing LR.

103(a)(1 ); State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho

586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)). "Objecting to the admission of
evidence on one basis does not preserve a separate and different basis for
exclusion of the evidence."

~

(citing State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 596, 836

P.2d 536, 542 (1992); Gleason, 130 Idaho at 592,944 P.2d at 727).
An exception to these principles exists if the alleged error constitutes
fundamental error.

State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010).

However, the burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the
defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal.

~

at 228, 245 P.3d at

980; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,717,215 P.3d 414,437 (2009). To carry
that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal must
demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to

11

whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
While Meadows challenged the admission of evidence associated with his
arrest by filing a motion to suppress, the motion was limited to two grounds:
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Meadows, and whether
Meadows unequivocally revoked his consent to allow the officers into his
apartment. (R., Vol. 11, pp.177-192; Tr., p.8, L.5 - p.44, L.5.) Assertion of these
grounds for suppression, however, did not preserve Meadows' claim on appeal
that the responding officers also exceeded the scope of Meadows' consent by
arresting him in the living room. That ground was not presented to the district
court, who did not have the opportunity to consider it. Therefore, Meadows must
show that the district court's failure to address this ground constituted
fundamental error.
However, because Meadows has not even asserted fundamental error,
much less attempted to carry his burden of demonstrating it, this Court must
decline to consider the merits of Meadows' claim.

Even if Meadows had

specifically asserted fundamental error, he would be unable to demonstrate it in
this case. Since this issue of the scope of the consent was not developed below,
Meadows cannot affirmatively show either that his constitutional rights were
violated, that any error plainly exists on the available record, or that any error
was not harmless.

12

Because Meadows failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, this
Court should not consider it.

E.

Even If The Officers' Arrest Of Meadows Was Conducted In Violation of
The Fourth Amendment, The Officers Did Not Exploit Any Illegality To
Obtain Evidence To Support The Burglary And Concealment Of Evidence
Charges
Even where an appellant shows error, a conviction will nonetheless be

affirmed if the appellate court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there
is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. State v.
Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 539, 37 P.3d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 2001).

In this case,

because no evidence subject to suppression was actually admitted at Meadows'
trial, this Court may conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that even if the district
court erred in denying Meadows' motion to suppress, such error had no effect on
the trial and was therefore harmless.
Not all evidence uncovered by police who have in some way acted
contrary to the Fourth Amendment is subject to suppression; on the contrary,
only that evidence acquired through exploitation of the primary illegality is subject
to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule requires exclusion of evidence
only if there is a factual nexus between the illegal conduct of state agents and the
evidence sought to be suppressed. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184, 125
P.3d 536, 540 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 95, 98, 29 P.3d 406,
409 (Ct. App. 2005).
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Here there was no exploitation of the alleged illegality of the arrest, and no
factual nexus between the alleged illegal arrest and any of the evidence
supporting the burglary and felony concealing of evidence convictions. Those
charges were supported at trial by: (1) eyewitness testimony of the victim and
party attendees, with whom the officer spoke prior to his contact with Meadows;
(2) property belonging to Fredrickson discovered in Meadows' vehicle, which was
recovered after police obtained a search warrant; and (3) property belonging to
Fredrickson discovered in the apartment complex and community dumpster.
(See generally, Tr.)

The officers did not obtain any additional corroborative

evidence supporting these criminal charges as the result of their contact with
Meadows, before or after the arrest. 2 Meadows did not make any inculpatory
admissions to officers, and

no contraband was found

inside Meadows'

apartment. (Tr., p.199, Ls.8-20; p.252, L.5 - p.254, L.15; p.260, Ls.11-14.)
Even if the officers arrested Meadows in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, Meadows has failed to identify any evidence that was acquired
through exploitation of that alleged illegality, and no such evidence is apparent

2

Further, evidence that Meadows physically resisted the arrest would be
admissible to support a charge of obstructing an officer. State v. Richardson, 95
Idaho 446, 451, 511 P.2d 263 (1973) (a citizen may not use force to resist
peaceful arrest by an authorized peace officer performing his duties, regardless
of whether the arrest is illegal); see also State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 198 P.3d
735 (Ct. App. 2008). In this case, the officers did not derive evidence of
Meadow's new criminal conduct of obstruct and delay from an exploitation of any
illegal seizure. See State v. Mayorga, 876 S.W.2d 176, 177-178 (Tx. App. 1994)
(evidence that a person resisted arrest is normally outside the field of exploitation
because the arresting officer cannot foresee whether the person he sets out to
arrest will resist).
14

from the record. Because Meadows had identified no evidence that would have
been suppressed had he actually demonstrated a violation of his rights, and
because no evidence that would have been subject to suppression was admitted
at the trial, any error in denying the suppression motion is necessary harmless.

11.
Meadows Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Supporting His Conviction For
Felony Concealment of Evidence Was Insufficient To Prove His Guilt
A.

Introduction
Meadows contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's

verdict finding him guilty of felony concealment of evidence. (Appellant's brief,
pp.15-20.)

A review of the record, however, shows the jury verdict was

supported by substantial evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this
review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991 ).
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Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed
in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607.
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove The Essential
Elements Of Felony Concealment Of Evidence
A conviction for felony concealment of evidence requires the state to

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, and in relevant part, that the defendant had
the specific intent to prevent the evidence from being "produced, used or
discovered as evidence upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation." I.C.
§ 18-2603.
In this case, the state presented evidence that Fredrickson and the
responding officer located papers and envelopes containing Fredrickson's name,
and a photo depicting Fredrickson's dog, in the community trash dumpster at
Meadows' apartment complex. (Tr., p.102, Ls.13-20; p.105, L.25 - p.109, L.1 O;
p.154, L.14 - p.158, L.25.) During closing argument, the prosecutor pointed out
that, for the most part, the items found in Meadows' vehicle did not have
Fredrickson's name on them, while the items found in the dumpster either
contained Frederickson's name, or were otherwise self-identifying as belonging
to Fredrickson (e.g., the photo of his dog).
L.1.)

(Augmented Tr., p.89, L.8 - p.91,

The prosecutor asked the jurors to make the reasonable inference that

Meadows had concealed and discarded the items with Fredrickson's name on
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them in the community dumpster, outside of his apartment and outside of his
vehicle, for the purpose of concealing his connection with the crime. (Id.)
On appeal, Meadows simply provides an alternate inference - that
Meadows discarded the envelopes, papers, and photo, because they were
worthless.

(Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.)

While this inference may also be

reasonable, an appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at
292,955 P.2d at 607; Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998.
Meadows has failed to establish that the state presented insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of felony concealment of
evidence. This Court should thus affirm the conviction.

111.
Meadows Has Failed To Show That The District Court Utilized Facts Not Found
By The Jury To Increase The Statutory Maximum Penalty For The Concealing
Evidence Charge In Violation Of Apprendi v. New Jersey

A.

Introduction
Meadows contends, for the first time on appeal, that even if the state

presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of
concealment of evidence, the district court improperly enhanced the charge from
a misdemeanor to a felony without the requisite jury findings, in violation of
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Apprendi v. New Jersey. 3 (Appellant's brief, pp.21-23.) Essentially, Meadows
claims that the district court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the
elements that enhance the concealment of evidence charge to a felony.

(Id.)

However, a review of the record reveals that the jury was properly instructed on
all of the necessary elements of felony concealment of evidence. Meadows has
thus failed to show error, let alone fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, _ , 261
P.3d 853, 864-865 (2011 ); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71, 78
(2010) (citing State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002)). "An
erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as
a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at_, 261
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, _ , 247 P.3d 582,
600-01 (2010)).

3

In his appellant's brief, Meadows also makes the conclusory assertion that
Meadows' 12-year unified sentence for concealing evidence exceeds the
statutory maximum for that crime and is thus illegal. (Appellant's brief, p.17.)
Presumably, Meadows contends that the concealment charge was not properly
enhanced by the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. The state does
not respond to this contention because Meadows does not support it with
argument or authority, State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument, they will not be considered"), and because it is not stated
in the "Issues" section of his brief. See I.AR. 35(a)(4). Meadows, of course,
may make a motion with the trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time.
I.C.R. 35(a).
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C.

The District Court Properly Instructed The Jury
Concealment of evidence is a misdemeanor offense unless "[t]he

defendant knew that an object was about to be produced, used, or discovered as
evidence in any legally authorized trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation
involving a felony offense." State v. Peteia, 139 Idaho 607, 610, 83 P.3d 781,
784 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added); see also LC. § 18-2603. Whether an
investigation "involves a felony offense" depends upon whether the evidence that
was destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to demonstrate the
commission of a felony. Peteia, 139 Idaho at 612, 83 P.3d at 786.
In this case, the jury was instructed that in order to find Meadows guilty of
felony concealment of evidence, the state must prove, in relevant part, that "the
[d]efendant, Dupree Lamar Meadows, knowing that certain items were about to
be produced or used or discovered as evidence in a burglary inquiry or

investigation or proceeding or trial... did willfully conceal the same with the intent
to prevent it from being produced or used or discovered."

(R., Vol. II, p.311

(emphasis added).)
Meadows contends that this instruction omitted the required elements of
criminal investigation and felony offense, because "[w]hile burglary is mentioned,
even assuming arguendo that the jury could find this to be an investigation that is
criminal in nature, there is nothing in the evidence presented to it from which the
jury could find that it was a felony (regardless of what the bench and bar may
know.)" (Appellant's brief, pp.21-23.) Therefore, argues Meadows, the jury only
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found facts establishing that Meadows was guilty of misdemeanor concealment
of evidence, and by entering a felony sentence, the district court exceeded the
maximum sentence warranted by the facts reflected in the jury verdict, thus
causing an Apprendi violation. 4 (Id.)
However, Meadows concedes on appeal that he did not object at trial to
the jury instructions. (Appellant's brief, p.29;

also Tr., p.264, Ls.2-10.) His

claim that the district court improperly instructed the jury is, therefore, not
preserved and may not be considered for the first time on appeal absent a
showing of fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at 977; State v.
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). Meadows has failed
to show error, let alone fundamental error.
Because the jury was properly instructed on the felony concealing
evidence charge, Meadows has failed to satisfy the first element of Perry, that
one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights were violated.

Perry, 150

Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. The jury was specifically instructed that the
evidence Meadows concealed had to pertain to a burglary inquiry or investigation
or proceeding at trial.

(R., Vol. 11, p.311.)

Whether the jury was specifically

aware that burglary was a felony is inconsequential. By finding that the evidence
4

Any fact that increases a sentence beyond its statutory maximum must be
submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Under Apprendi and its progeny, the statutory
maximum is "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-304 (2004).

20

at issue pertained to a burglary inquiry, it necessarily found that the evidence
pertained to a felony criminal inquiry. 5
Meadows further cites to Peteia to support his contention (Appellant's
brief, p.22), however that case is easily distinguished from the present case. The
state charged Peteja with felony concealment of evidence. Peteja, 139 Idaho at
609, 83 P.3d at 783. At trial, the jury was instructed that in order to find Peteja
guilty of that crime, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peteja
"destroyed and/or concealed a clear baggy with a white powder substance" and
"knew said baggy was about to be produced, used or discovered as evidence in
an investigation authorized by law."

Mt

at 610-612, 83 P.3d at 784-786. The

Idaho Court of Appeals held that these jury instructions did not fairly and
accurately reflect the applicable law because they omitted the necessary
elements that the investigation was "criminal in nature" and "involve[d] a felony
offense."

Mt at

608- 612, 83 P.3d at 782-786. However, the instructions in the

present case, rather than describing conduct which did not necessarily
demonstrate the commission of a felony, such as the "clear baggy with a white
powder substance" instruction in Peteia, instead specifically referenced a felony
crime, burglary.
Meadows also cannot show that any error was "clear or obvious, without
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision."
5

The jury instructions of course, also defined burglary, since Meadows was
charged with that crime as well. (R., Vol. II, pp.307-310.)
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Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

Even if Meadows' counsel had

deemed the instruction technically erroneous for failing to expressly require that
the evidence pertained to a "felony" or "criminal" investigation, counsel may have
deliberately chosen to forgo objecting for any number of reasons, including a
determination that Meadows could preserve a potential appellate issue without
prejudicing Meadows at trial. Meadows' counsel may also have wished to omit
the potentially prejudicial term, "felony," from the jury instructions.
Meadows has also failed to carry his burden of establishing the third prong
of the fundamental error standard, which requires him to demonstrate that the
error he asserts was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the standard for harmless error
applicable to claims that a jury instruction omitted an element of a charged
offense as follows:
[W]here the jury instructions were only partially erroneous, such as
where the jury instructions improperly omitted one element of a
charged offense, the appellate court may apply the harmless error
test, and where the evidence supporting a finding on the omitted
element is overwhelming and uncontroverted, so that no rational
jury could have found that the state failed to prove that element, the
constitutional violation may be deemed harmless.
Draper, 151 Idaho at_, 261 P.3d at 868 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at_, 245
P.3d at 976). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999) ("[Wjhere a
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element
was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is
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properly found to be harmless."). For the reasons set forth above, application of
this standard to the facts of this case shows that even if it was error to omit the
term "felony" and/or "criminal" from the elements instruction, such error was
harmless.

The jury necessarily found that Meadows willfully concealed the

papers in the dumpster knowing that they would be utilized "in a burglary inquiry
or investigation or proceeding or trial." (R., Vol. II, p.311.) Meadows has failed to
demonstrate how a properly instructed jury would not have found burglary to be a
felony or a crime. Therefore, this Court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury verdict would have been the same even absent the alleged error.
Meadows has failed to carry his burden of establishing that the error was not
harmless.

His claim of instructional error, raised for the first time on appeal,

therefore fails.

IV.
Meadows Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing He Is Entitled To
Relief Based Upon His Unpreserved Due Process Claim Of A Variance Between
The Jury Instructions And The Facts Alleged In The Charging Document
A.

Introduction
Meadows contends, for the first time on appeal, that there was a fatal

variance between the charging document and the jury instruction with regard to
the obstruct and delay of a police officer charge. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-31.)
While the state concedes that a variance existed, the record reveals that it did
not rise to the level of fundamental error.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233

P.3d 71, 78 (2010) (citing State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298
(2002)). Whether there is a variance between a charging document and the jury
instructions at trial, and whether such variance is fatal to the conviction, are also
questions of law given free review on appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56,
57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Because Meadows Failed To Obiect Below, His Claim Of A Variance Has
Not Been Preserved For Appeal, And He Has Failed To Show He Is
Entitled To Review Under The Fundamental Error Doctrine
"A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts

different from those alleged in the indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S.
100, 105 (1979). A variance also occurs where the jury instructions given at trial
allow the jury to convict the defendant of the charged crime, but on one or more
alternative theories than alleged in the charging document. See, ~ . State v.
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985).
A variance between a charging document and a jury instruction or the
evidence adduced at trial requires reversal only when it deprives the defendant of
his substantial rights by violating the defendant's right to fair notice or leaving him
or her open to the risk of double jeopardy. State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 47,
175 P.3d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d
881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003); Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, 716 P.2d at 1189-90. A
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defendant is deprived of fair notice only if he was misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his defense. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178,
182, 191 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2008).
Further, and as discussed above, "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of appellate
law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an
issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67,
76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976,
("Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for
appeal through an objection at trial.").
Meadows concedes on appeal that he did not object at trial to the jury
instructions on the obstruct and delay charge. (Appellant's brief, p.29; see also
Tr., p.264, Ls.2-10.) His claim that those instructions impermissibly varied from
the allegations of the charging document and the evidence adduced at trial is,
therefore, not preserved and may not be considered for the first time on appeal
absent a showing of fundamental error.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 225, 245 P.3d at

977; State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007).
The state concedes that there was a variance in this case. The amended
charging information alleged that Meadows willfully resisted and/or obstructed a
public officer(s) "by knowingly mak[ing] a false report to the officers." (R., Vol. II,
p.236.)

At trial, the jury instructions advised the jury of this charge and the

alleged facts in nearly identical language. (R., Vol. II, p.294.) However, the jury
instructions also contained the pattern jury instructions for obstruct and delay -
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that in order to find Meadows guilty of that crime, the state must prove that
Meadows "resisted and/or obstructed and/or delayed a public officer" "in the
discharge of or attempt to discharge a duty of his office." (R., Vol. II, p 311 ;6 see
also ICJI 1260.) Thus, the jury instruction, while a correct statement of the law,
allowed the jury to find Meadows guilty of obstruct and delay using an alternative
theory than alleged in the charging document - that Meadows physically resisted
arrest. Further, at trial, the state presented evidence supporting this theory. (Tr.,
p.63, L.11 - p.64, L.3; p.99, L.19 - p.101, L.14; p.173, Ls.7-20; p.220, Ls.1-14;
p.221, Ls.1-14).
Applying the appropriate standards to this case, however, reveals
Meadows has failed to carry his burden of establishing a variance of
constitutional significance that requires reversal.

Meadows does not contend

that the alleged variance leaves him exposed to double jeopardy, and he has
failed to demonstrate from the record that the variance actually prejudiced the
preparation of his defense.

There is no indication in the record that, had

Meadows been provided the notice he claims the instructions deprived him of he
would have conducted his cross-examinations of the state's witnesses any

6

Jury Instruction #22, which instructed the jury on the elements of obstruct and
delay, appears on an unnumbered page between pages 311 and 312 of Volume
11 of the clerk's record.
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differently, or that he would have presented a different theory of his case at trial. 7
Meadows has thus failed to satisfy the first element of Perry, that one or more of
[his] unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245
P.3d at 980.
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978
(foot-note omitted).

Meadows cannot satisfy this element because he cannot

show from the appellate record that he would have conducted his defense
differently, as explained above. Likewise, he has failed to show that the decision
of his trial counsel to not object to the jury instructions defining obstruct and delay
was based on ignorance of the law or other objective shortcomings, as opposed
to being merely a tactical decision.
The final element of a claim of fundamental error requires Meadows to
"demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. As previously indicated, a variance
affects the substantial rights of a defendant only "when it deprives the defendant
of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy." State
7

Meadows' defense to the obstructing an officer charge at trial was that in light of
the early morning hour of the police arrival and the surprise of the situation,
Meadows' conduct with the officers did not constitute a willful obstruction of
officers. (Augmented Tr., p.106, L. 7 - p.108, L.22.)
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v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165, 90 P.3d 910, 915 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing
\Vindsor, 110 Idaho at 417-78, 716 P.2d 1189-90 (footnote omitted)).
reasons already explained,

For the

Meadows has failed to demonstrate that his

substantial rights were affected by the variance he claims for the first time on
appeal and has, therefore, failed to satisfy the final element of the Perry
fundamental error analysis.
Meadows has failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions and,
as such, has failed to show any basis for reversal of his conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Meadows' convictions
for burglary, felony concealment of evidence, and the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement.
DATED this 14th day of February 2012.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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